SHF Holdings and PCCU Alliance: Contractual Default and Termination Covenants
What contractual covenants, liquidity tests, and default remedies permit early termination of the commercial alliance between SHF Holdings and Partner Colorado Credit Union?
By Austin Kline
Founder & Lead Analyst · Research methodology
Published 2026-11-14 · Last updated 2026-11-14
Drafted with AI assistance from company filings and reported figures; published under Austin Kline's research rules. How reports are made
Executive summary
Under the Second Amended Commercial Alliance Agreement, Partner Colorado Credit Union can terminate its relationship with SHF Holdings if the company fails to maintain monthly liquidity certifications backing its uncapped 65% loan indemnification obligation or misses a required loss-sharing payment. Additional termination mechanisms include insolvency triggers releasing proprietary software source code from escrow to PCCU, as well as NCUA regulatory concentration limits on cannabis-related deposits.
Termination Triggers and Default Remedies
Added 2026-11-14
Under the Second Amended Commercial Alliance Agreement (CAA) disclosed in SHF Holdings, Inc.’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2025 (and reiterated in its Form S-1 filed in November 2026), Partner Colorado Credit Union (PCCU) has specific contractual covenants, liquidity tests, and default remedies that allow it to terminate the relationship early or take control of the operating platform.
The primary covenants, default conditions, and exit mechanisms include:
1. The Monthly Liquidity Certification Covenant
- The Obligation: Under the Second Amended CAA (retroactively effective October 1, 2025, and formally executed on February 4, 2026), Safe Harbor must certify to PCCU on a monthly basis that it maintains sufficient cash, cash equivalents, and overall balance-sheet resources to back its 65% loan indemnification obligation.
- The Termination Trigger: Because Safe Harbor’s indemnification obligation has no maximum dollar cap (covering up to 65% of net default losses on principal, accrued interest, collection costs, and collateral disposition costs across PCCU’s cannabis-related business loan book), an inability to certify adequate liquidity constitutes a material breach that allows PCCU to declare an event of default and exit the agreement.
2. Failure to Fund an Indemnification Claim
- Direct Default Mechanism: If a borrower in PCCU’s loan portfolio defaults and Safe Harbor cannot immediately deliver its required cash share under the 65% loss-sharing formula, PCCU is forced to absorb the credit loss directly.
- Safe Harbor explicitly acknowledges in Item 7 of its 2025 Form 10-K that failing to fund an indemnification claim constitutes an immediate event of default under the Second Amended CAA, terminating the relationship and jeopardizing the company's ability to operate.
3. Bankruptcy, Insolvency, and the Source Code Escrow Forfeiture
The Second Amended CAA contains a specific intellectual property default covenant designed to ensure PCCU can operate the cannabis banking program without Safe Harbor if the company fails:
- Escrowed Software Requirement: Safe Harbor is contractually required to deposit a current copy of the source code and technical documentation for its proprietary onboarding and compliance software into an independent escrow account.
- The Trigger & Remedy: If Safe Harbor enters into bankruptcy, insolvency proceedings, or commits "certain defaults" under the Second Amended CAA, the escrow agent must immediately release the source code directly to PCCU.
- Upon release, PCCU receives a non-exclusive, fully paid-up, royalty-free license to use, modify, and operate the software to service the accounts itself. This mechanism allows PCCU to sever ties with SHF Holdings without disrupting its underlying deposit operations.
4. Regulatory Concentration and NCUA Compliance Limits
While not phrased as a traditional borrower financial covenant, PCCU’s regulatory posture provides it with unilateral operational discretion:
- PCCU is a federally chartered credit union regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). It operates under strict portfolio concentration limits, including a cap restricting cannabis-related business (CRB) deposits to 60% of total assets.
- As disclosed in the risk factors of the 2025 Form 10-K, Safe Harbor has no legal ability to compel PCCU to originate loans, accept deposits, or maintain its current regulatory posture. If NCUA examiners order PCCU to reduce cannabis concentrations, modify risk-management protocols, or exit higher-risk commercial sectors, PCCU can halt originations or unwind the program.
5. Term Expiration and Non-Renewal Window
- Although the Second Amended CAA extended the primary customer agreement from December 31, 2028, to December 31, 2031, automatic renewal is conditional.
- PCCU can terminate the relationship at the end of the term (or any subsequent two-year renewal cycle) by providing written notice of non-renewal at least 12 calendar months prior to expiration.
The Economic Catch-22: The Nasdaq Covenant Provision
The agreement also includes an adjustment mechanism tied to Safe Harbor’s stock exchange listing. If maintaining Safe Harbor's Nasdaq listing requires a reduction in its indemnification percentage (to prevent equity reserves from breaching exchange equity minimums), the agreement allows the indemnity to be dialed down—but Safe Harbor's share of loan program income must automatically fall by an identical percentage.
While this prevents an immediate technical termination, it structurally squeezes Safe Harbor's revenue run rate, accelerating operating cash burn and increasing the probability of a subsequent liquidity certification default.
Research for information only, not investment advice. Figures reflect the dates shown; earlier sections are kept as written for the historical record.
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